Pay and recognitionBrazil

Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados (PLR)

Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados

Literally: participation in profits or results

Country of origin: Brazil
Type
Law or collective agreement
Origin
Lei 10.101/2000, Brazilian federal government
First documented
1994
Last reviewed
12 November 2026

In short

PLR is Brazil’s legal framework for sharing a company’s profits or results with its workers. Each plan is negotiated between the company and its staff, through a joint commission with a union representative or a collective agreement, and tied to agreed targets. Payments are not treated as salary, so they carry no labour charges and are taxed separately from pay.

Where it comes from

Smiling woman in a blue work jacket and yellow hard hat standing on a factory floor
Illustrative photo, not taken in Brazil. ckstockphoto / Envato Elements

The right of workers to share in profits or results appears in Article 7, item XI, of the 1988 Constitution, which Lei 10.101 cites as its basis. The law presents PLR as a way to integrate capital and labour and as an incentive to productivity (Lei 10.101/2000, Art. 1).

The government first regulated PLR by provisional measure in December 1994 (Silveira, 2000). The last of these measures, MP 1.982-77, became Lei 10.101 on 19 December 2000. Lei 12.832 of 2013 created a separate income tax table for PLR, and Lei 14.020 of 2020 allowed companies to run several programmes at once (Lei 10.101, compiled text).

  1. 1988Constitution, Article 7, item XI, gives workers a right to share profits
  2. 1994First provisional measure regulates PLR in December
  3. 2000Lei 10.101 adopted on 19 December
  4. 2013Lei 12.832 creates a separate tax table for PLR
  5. 2020Lei 14.020 allows several programmes at once

How it works

  • Negotiation. Company and staff choose together between a joint commission, with a representative named by the union, and a collective agreement or convention (Lei 10.101/2000, Art. 2).
  • Clear rules. The agreement must set clear rules on amounts, payment dates and review periods. It may use productivity, quality or profitability indicators, or programmes of targets, results and deadlines agreed in advance (Art. 2, § 1).
  • Union filing. The signed agreement is filed with the workers’ union (Art. 2, § 2).
  • Payment limits. Payments may not be made more than twice in the same calendar year, nor at intervals shorter than one calendar semester (Art. 3, § 2).
  • Outside pay. PLR does not replace or add to salary and is not a base for labour charges. The company deducts it as an operating expense (Art. 3).
  • Tax. Income tax on PLR is withheld at source, apart from other income, under its own progressive table whose first bracket is taxed at 0% (Lei 12.832/2013).
  • Deadlock. If talks stall, the parties may use mediation or final-offer arbitration, in which the arbitrator must pick one side’s proposal unchanged (Art. 4).

Who uses it

Carvalho Neto (2001) studied 75 PLR agreements in São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Mercedes-Benz was the first of the 4 automakers studied to negotiate PLR, in 1993-1994. Fiat tied all of its payments to targets from the start, while Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and Scania first paid about 60% as a fixed amount. Banks set PLR in national agreements negotiated with their employers’ federation, FENABAN.

DIEESE, the research body of Brazilian unions, analysed 123 PLR agreements and conventions negotiated in 2005, 73.2% of them in industry (DIEESE, 2006).

  • Mercedes-Benz
  • Volkswagen

What the evidence says

Peer-reviewed: Carvalho Neto (2001), in the Revista de Administração Contemporânea, analysed 1,583 clauses from 75 agreements and 39 interviews in the automotive, chemical, banking and telecoms sectors between 1995 and 1998. In automotive and chemical firms, most payments were tied to productivity and quality targets. In banking and telecoms, payments were not linked to targets and the author concludes that negotiation largely did not take place.

Peer-reviewed review: Corrêa and Lima (2006), in the Revista de Economia Contemporânea, find mixed but generally favourable international evidence, with productivity gains as the most consistent result, and no consensus on employment and profitability. For Brazil they cite Zylberstajn (2002), who found a positive effect of target-linked PLR on perceived productivity compared with bonuses not tied to targets. They describe the Brazilian experience as little studied.

Limits and criticism

  • PLR can replace wage rises. Carvalho Neto (2001) found that fixed PLR payments took the place of real wage increases in the chemical and banking sectors, and Corrêa and Lima (2006) note that firms prefer to negotiate PLR payments over inflation-based wage adjustments.
  • Many plans had no targets and worked as plain bonuses, which limits any effect on productivity (Carvalho Neto, 2001).
  • Staff commissions without job protection struggle to challenge management. Carvalho Neto (2001) reports that after a fatal accident at Solvay, the weight of the accident target was cut to zero, a penalty he says placed the blame on workers.
  • Small firms are hard to reach: the chemical workers’ union said it could not negotiate with about 600 firms in its area (Carvalho Neto, 2001).
  • Evidence on Brazilian outcomes remains thin and rests on perceived rather than measured productivity (Corrêa and Lima, 2006).

What it would take elsewhere

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The culture this practice needs

Nine cultural conditions decide whether Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados (PLR) can take root in an organisation. This profile shows the level each condition needs and which ones are critical.

Part of the Adoption toolkit

The cultural profile of every practice is included in the Adoption toolkit plan, together with Field Notes.

See the plans

Frameworks. The Leading, Deciding, Evaluating and Disagreeing scales come from Erin Meyer, The Culture Map (PublicAffairs, 2014). The trust, risk-taking and openness elements come from Steve Gruenert and Todd Whitaker, School Culture Rewired (ASCD, 2015). The autonomy and cross-team cooperation conditions are by Benjamin Chaminade. The profile of this practice is an editorial assessment by Trendemic, based on the sources of this entry.

Sources

  1. Lei nº 10.101, de 19 de dezembro de 2000 (official copy, Ministério da Economia). bibliotecadigital.pre.economia.gov.br
  2. Lei nº 10.101 (texto compilado, with amendments up to Lei 14.020/2020). planalto.gov.br
  3. Lei nº 12.832, de 20 de junho de 2013. planalto.gov.br
  4. Carvalho Neto, A. (2001). A negociação da participação nos lucros e resultados: estudo em quatro setores dinâmicos da economia brasileira. RAC, 5(1), 195–214. rac.anpad.org.br
  5. Corrêa, D. and Lima, G. T. (2006). Participação dos trabalhadores nos lucros e resultados das empresas: lições da experiência internacional. Revista de Economia Contemporânea, 10(2), 357–388. revistas.ufrj.br
  6. Silveira, S. M. (2000). Participação nos lucros ou resultados: oportunidade ou desafio para o movimento sindical? RAC, 4(3), 47–65. redalyc.org
  7. DIEESE (2006). Participação dos trabalhadores nos lucros ou resultados das empresas 2005. Estudos e Pesquisas nº 22. dieese.org.br
  8. Receita Federal (2022). Grandes Números DIRPF 2022, ano-calendário 2021: tabelas. gov.br
  9. Receita Federal (2025). Grandes Números IRPF 2025, ano-calendário 2024: tabelas. gov.br